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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LLOYD BRANCH and JEANNE
BRANCH,
Plaintiffs-Respondents
and Cross-Appellants,
v.

WESTERN PETROLEUM, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant
and Cross-Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. 17178

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF AND
RESPONSE TO CROSS-APPEAL

POINT I.

THE POSITION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND THE PLAINTIFFS THAT THE OPERATION OF A FORMATION WATER
DISPOSAL POND IS AN ULTRA-HAZARDOUS ACTIVITY
IMPOSING STRICT LIABILITY ON DEFENDANT, IS
NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY EVIDENCE IN THE CASE,
AND IS CONTRARY TO THE LAW OF AMERICAN JURISDICTIONS WHICH HAVE CONSIDERED THE ISSUE.

The central issue in this case, and the issue upon
which the questions raised by Defendant concerning negligence, proximate cause and comparative negligence, is
whether the law governing the use of oilfield formation
water disposal pits is strict liability based on ultrahazardous activity or traditional negligence law.

The

decision on that point resolves most of the remaining points
on the appeal.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-1-

Despite the fact that both parties requested instructions to the jury on negligence and proximate cause, (R.
67,77,79,94 and 97), the trial court decided that the law
of strict liability applied.

In discussing the law to be

applied in the case with counsel during the trial, the
following dialogue occurred when Defendant's counsel insisted that a finding of negligence by the jury was necessary and proper:
Mr. McKeachnie: Your Honor, this fact situation
comes up every day in Rural Utah in irrigation
water, where my water escapes from my property and
goes into my neighbor's basement, or onto my
neighbor's fields; and the test there is the test
of negligence.
The Court:
Mr. Mangan:
here.
The Court:
is --

Well, now wait just a minute.
You've got a different situation
I think that a test of negligence

Mr. McKeachnie: The test there is: Did I act as
a reasonably prudent irrigator to control my
water.
The Court: Well, the point is that if you did
everything that a reasonable prudent person could
to control the water, then it's not your fault
that it goes onto somebody else's ground. That's
what you are talking about, is it's somebody
else's fault that it goes there. It isn't an act
of God --well, it could be an act of God, but it's
somebody else's fault, either an act of God, or
somebody else's fault that the water gets on
there.
Mr. McKeachnie: But I was intentionally applying
the water to my property.
The Court: All right. But if you are intentionally irrigating your ground and -- well, let's put
it this
way:
That's
aby the
different
story.
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Mr. Mangan:

Unlawful act.

Mr. McKeachnie:

Why is it different?

The Court: No. Where you know or have reason to
believe, and the jury's got to decide that case
that's a different color of a horse than putting
something in a pit that seeps down into the other
guy's property. You've got a right to have him
quit doing that.
Mr. McKeachnie:

The test is still negligence.

The Court: No. The test is not negligence at
all, where it's a willful act such as that.
Mr. McKeachnie:
The Court:

Doing it.

Mr. McKeachnie:
The Court:

Well, what's the "willful"?

Intentionally deposit the water?

Yes.

Mr. McKeachnie: All right. But aren't you intentionally putting the water on your property?
The Court: No. What you want to say is, and what
I want to say is, that there's a difference in
intentionally putting the water on your crop and
intentionally putting the water on somebody else's
land.

Mr. McKeachnie: Okay.
tionally doing that?
The Court:
tion. If it
other guy's
putting the

Well,
seeps
land,
stuff

Mr. McKeachnie:
it goes there?
The Court:

And you say we are inten-

yes. Well, it's a jury quesdown through and goes onto the
then you are intentionally
into his well.
Just by virtue of the fact that

Sure, if that's what happened.

Mr. McKeachnie: How is that different than irrigating on a hill where it comes out down below?
That happens every day.
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The Court: If you are irrigating on a hill and
the water gets away from you, I think it's the
same kind of thing; because the originally reasonable and prudent person would know that to put
x-second-feet of water on a hillside is to get
away and go on to somebody else's ground.
Mr. McKeachnie: If the ordinary prudent man
passes the test, we'll live with that.
The Court: No, that isn't the test there. The
test is, there's no negligence question in this
case, in my judgment, and that's the way that it's
going to be.
Mr. Mangan:

I agree with that.

Mr. McKeachnie: Suppose that unbeknownst to
Western Petroleum -The Court: And if that's error, I give you a real
clear shot at it, because I can't equivocate in
that regard. I've already stated that negligence
is not involved in this case.
Mr. McKeachnie: If that's the case, then what you
are doing is saying that anybody that's in the
water hauling business that uses a pit has strict
liability.
The Court: Anybody that pollutes somebody else's
well has strict liability. There isn't any doubt
about it in my mind.

Mr. McKeachnie: We are making a strange mixture
of comparative negligence.
The Court: No. No. No. No.
comparative negligence at all.
Mr. McKeachnie:
The Court:
it.

I'm lost.

No.

There's no

I don't understand it.

Negligence hasn't anything to do with

Mr. McKeachnie: But that's the only contention in
which percentages come up.
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The Court: No, it isn't, because if the well is
being contaminated by two sources, I want to know
how much is being contaminated by one source and
how much by the other.
Mr. Mangan: See, and that's not negligence, that
could both of them be strict liability.

The Court: And I'm sorry that you don't agree
with me, particularly you, that negligence is not
involved in this case.
Mr. Allred: I'm sorry, Judge, but I've read three
A.L.R. 's and everyone of them says that's the
theory to use.

Mr. McKeachnie: What we are talking about in the
general concept of tort law then is you are defining this activity as an ultra-hazardous activity.
The Court: As a matter of fact, that's about what
I'm saying.
Mr. McKeachnie: So that whatever happens, it's
such a risky activity that whatever happens that
goes wrong, you pay?
The Court: Right, under the facts of this case.
He may be right as far as the general questions of
negligence is concerned. But under the facts of
this case, what they are doing there is so risky
and so ultra-hazardous as far as pollution is
concerned that there's just liability if -Mr. McKeachnie:
else is doing.

What they are doing, everybody

The Court: Yes. And that's, as far as I'm concerned, that, as the law, would be applicable to
them, too. I just don't think you can pollute
somebody's well and escape liability for it because you were doing what a reasonable and prudent
person would do under the same or similar circumstances.
Mr. McKeachnie:

What factors --
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The Court: Because it may get blown up. If you
are engaged in, as we had a case, in making explosives and one thing and another and the explosives get away and cause damage to somebody, I
think you are liable.
Mr. McKeachnie: Well, that's standard law. But
the law hasn't classified this activity. (T. 385410)

The Plaintiffs have asked this Court to sustain the
trial court and hold that, "Defendant was strictly liable
for the results of its act of intentionally conducting an
ultra-hazardous activity .... "

To adopt this position would

be to adopt the antiquated and repudiated doctrine of
Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330.

The authorities the

Plaintiffs rely on for their position, Edwards v. Talent
Irrigation District, 280 Or. 307 (1977); 570 P.2d 1169,
Drake v. Smith, 337 P.2d 1059 (Wash. 1959); 142 A.L.R. 1322;
and, 28 A.L.R.2d 1075, 1087 (1953), do not support their
position and did not consider the issue.
of those cases at Point II.

See, the discussion

The jurisdictions which have

considered the same facts and issues that are before this
Court have uniformly held that the plaintiff's recovery must
be based upon a theory of either negligence or nuisance.
United Fuel Gas Co. v. Sawyer, 259 S.W.2d 466 (Ken. 1953);
Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. 1936);
General Crude Oil Co. v. Aiken, 344 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1961).
The court in Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co. , supra, illustrate
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the strong policy supporting the rejection of the contention
that the operation of evaporation ponds constituted an
ultra-hazardous activity which should give rise to strict
liability when that court stated that:
The primary question for determination here is
whether or not the defendants in error, without
negligence on their part, may be held liable in
damages _for the destruction or injury .to property
occasioned by the escape of salt water from ponds
constructed and used by them in the operation of
their oil wells.

[T]he innnediate question presented is whether or
not defendants in error are to be held liable as
insurers, or whether the cause of action against
them must be predicated upon negligence. We
believe the question is one of first impression in
this court, and so we shall endeavor to discuss it
in a manner in keeping with its importance.

upon both reason and authority we believe that the
conclusion of the Court of Civil Appeals that
negligence is a prerequisite to recovery in a case
of this character is a correct one. Id, at 221222.
~
In holding that Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330,
was not good precedent for that type of case, the Texas
court stated:
While the rule has been followed to some extent in
this country, in general the American courts base
liability, where dams have broken, on negligence,
either in the original construction of the reservoir or in failing properly to provide against all
such contingent damages as might reasonably be
anticipated.

ed
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Accordingly it [the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher)
has not met with general acceptance in this country·
most of the authorities holding that liability for '
such injuries must be based upon negligence or
other culpability on the part of the person sought
to be responsible. The authorities are so numerous
as to make a review, or even the citation of them
all, impracticable.

There is nothing unlawful in collecting water for
such purposes; and hence, in case it escapes and
does mischief, the person so collecting it can
only be held liable on the ground of something
unlawful in the manner in which he has built or
maintained his structure,-that is, on the principle of negligence. Id, at 222-224.
The Texas court, after an in-depth analysis of Rylands
v. Fletcher, rejected that doctrine finding that (a) the
doctrine was generally repudiated in the United States, (b)
that the case and the conditions were factually different
than the conditions which gave rise to the case in England,
and (c) that liability based upon negligence rather than
absolute liability was the rule adopted by the majority of
jurisdictions in America.

Id 226.

The record in this case is completely barren of any
evidence even remotely indicating that the placing of formation water in evaporation pits is an ultra-hazardous activity
which cannot be adequately regulated by the traditional
concepts of fault.

To the contrary, all evidence before the

Court indicated that what Defendant was doing was a usual
and customary activity in oilfield operations and that there
are no inherent dangers involved and that it may be safely
conducted if done in a reasonable and prudent manner.
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Adoption of the Respondents' position that the Defendant is strictly liable would be to adopt a rule long
since repudiated, would be contrary to the evidence and
would reject the position taken by courts which have considered the issue before this Court.
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POINT II. THE AUTHORITIES AND FACTS THE PLAINTIFFS
CITE TO SUPPORT THEIR ARGUMENT THAT DEFENDANT VIOLATED STATE LAW, THAT THE DEFENDANT'S ACTIVITIES WERE WILLFUL AND
WANTON AND THAT THE DOCTRINE OF STRICT
LIABILITY SHOULD APPLY DO NOT SUPPORT
THE PLAINTIFFS' POSITION, AND ARE TAKEN OUT
OF CONTEXT AND WERE REJECTED BY THE COURT.
Plaintiffs' continuous assertions that Defendant's
operation of its formation water evaporation pit violated
State statute, e.g. Plaintiffs' brief, pages 13-14, are not
supported by any finding of the jury and, in fact, were
specifically rejected by the Court when it refused to
instruct the jury that such a violation had occurred, coneluding that the part relating to permits did not apply to
this particular fact situation.
Plaintiffs

(T. 397 lines 15,16,17)

made numerous attempts over a period of years to

enlist the aid of the State of Utah in their dispute with
Defendant.

Despite such efforts, the record clearly in-

dicates that the State took no action to prosecute Defendant
for violating State law or regulations or to require a
cessation of Defendant's business.

To the contrary, the

record shows that Defendant met with State officials and had
discussions regarding the pit, participated with the State
in a dye test to see if formation water from the pond was
entering into Plaintiffs' well, and otherwise acted in a
reasonable manner whenever the State officials corranunicated
with it.

(T. 112,153; Exhibits 12, 24)

Plaintiffs failed

to prove their claims of unlawfulness at trial and their
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reassertion of those claims here do not fairly reflect the
outcome of the case in the Court below.
Likewise, Plaintiffs' version of the facts, as argued
in their brief, constantly charging willful and wanton
conduct on the part of Defendant, deviates substantially
from the facts disclosed by the record.

Even Plaintiffs'

counsel, in his final argument to the jury, realized that
willful and malicious conduct had not been proven when he
said:
Now that 'willful and malicious' is a hard thing
to prove and talk about. And I don't think that
Mr. Kay would go up there and say, I'm going to go
pollute Branches' well. That sounds like willful
and malicious. But a reckless indifference and a
disregard, that I think has been proven. (T.
503)
Plaintiffs rely on Exhibit 38 in claiming that Defendant was violating an order of the State.

That letter was

not an order and was not sent by either the State Water
Pollution Board or the Oil, Gas & Mining Division which
regulates oil and gas activities. The Defendant's agents
never received the letter.

(T. 152,193)

The writing on

Exhibit 38 states, "I am not sure this letter was sent."
The party who allegedly sent the letter visited the pit
several times after the letter was sent and took no further
action and the agencies which have authority over these
types of activities made no effort over a period of years
following the claimed order to halt the Defendant's activi-
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ties but instead, indicated the pit was satisfactory or
worked with the Defendant to determine if the formation
water was percolating into the underground water system.
(T. 81,152,193)
The Court also hesitated in allowing the punitive
damages found by the jury when, after trial, it reduced the
jury finding of punitive damage of $13,000.00 to $5,000.00.
(R. 258)

The Court later changed its mind and deleted the

$10,000.00 award for discomfort and annoyance and let the
punitive damage award stand.

(R. 259)

The Court should not

be misled by Plaintiffs' assertions of fact which are not
supported by the record.

On a similar point, the authorities used to support
Plaintiffs' position in their brief often lack any relevance
to the proposition for which they are cited.

For example,

on page 12 of Plaintiffs' Brief, in support of the proposition that the law of negligence does not apply, the Plaintiffs
rely on Edwards v. Talent Irrigation District, 280 Or. 307
(1977); 570 P.2d 1169; Drake v. Smith, 337 P.2d 1059 (Wash.
1959); 142 A.L.R. 1322; and, 28 A.L.R.2d 1075, 1087 (1953).
Even a cursory reading of those authorities reveals that
they do not stand for the proposition asserted.

In Edwards

v. Talent Irrigation District, supra, the defendant's recovery was premised on a finding that the plaintiff was
negligent which is the majority rule and the position of the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-12-

Defendant.

Drake v. Smith, supra, was based on the theory

of nuisance and the issue before that court involved the
question of permanent depreciation.

142 A.L.R. 1322 is a

compilation of cases considering whether damages for discomfort, annoyance, etc., can be awarded in nuisance cases.
28 A.L.R.2d 1075 considered cases discussing damage awards
for shock due to witnessing property damage.
The authorities and facts cited by the Plaintiffs are
often taken out of context and do not support the proposition advanced by the Plaintiffs.

Defendant would request

the Court to carefully consider the facts of the case and
the authorities cited.

-13-
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POINT III. DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED A HEARING
TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE JURY SELECTION WAS
PROPER AND, IF NOT, WHETHER THE DEFENDANT
WAS PREJUDICED.
Plaintiffs assert that Defendant must show that it has
sustained "actual and substantial injustice and prejudice"
before it would be entitled to a new trial on the grounds of
improper jury selection.

Defendant's point on appeal is

that it has been denied the opportunity to make that showing.

Defendant should be granted a hearing to allow it to

make the necessary showing as provided in Utah Code Ann.

§78-46-16(2).
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POINT IV. THE COURT SHOULD APPORTION THE DAMAGES
ACCORDING TO THE PERCENTAGE OF POLLUTION
ATTRIBUTED BY THE JURY TO THE DEFENDANT
AND TO OTHER THIRD PARTIES AND CONDITIONS
IF THE DEFENDANT IS STRICTLY LIABLE.
The damages, if any, awarded to the Plaintiffs should
be reduced by the percentage of negligence attributable to
Plaintiffs and other parties pursuant to this State's comparative negligence statute.

If the Court were to pronounce

the law of strict liability as governing this case, a
proposition which Defendant strongly resists, then the
damages should be apportioned based on the percentage of
pollution caused by each party. It would be wrong to hold
the Defendant liable for the entire damages when the jury
has determined that the Defendant was responsible for only
part of the pollution.

Monroe Corp. Pond Co. v. River

Raisin Paper Co., 240 Mich. 279, 215 N.W. 325 (1927); R.
Clark Water and Water Rights §219.3(B); and, Restatement of
Torts Second §433A (1965).
The Plaintiffs' argument that if the total dissolved
solids in Plaintiffs' well water is multiplied by the
percentage pollution attributed to Defendant, then Defendant is responsible for all dissolved solids above
health standards is not logically or scientifically sound
and it is not supported by the evidence nor the jury
instructions.

The major fallacy in Plaintiffs' ar-

gument is that pollution and total dissolved solids are
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not synonymous.

(T. 128-129)

Plaintiffs called Mr.

Richards, a chemist, who stated that water could have a high
level of certain substances such as sugar which would not be
harmful, while a very low level of mercury or other toxic
substances could be deadly and still be below any health
standard for dissolved solids.

(T. 128-129)

The Court

recognizing the difference between pollution and total
dissolved solids instructed the jury that the term "pollution" referred to man-made alterations of the quality of
water that appreciably impaired its usefulness for a particular purpose.

(R. 119)

If it were otherwise, both milk

and orange juice would be unhealthful because of too high a
level of dissolved solids.

Therefore, any percentage of

pollution would cause damage to the Plaintiffs.

The jury,

following the instruction of the Court, determined the
percentage of pollution attributable to Defendant and to
other parties and conditions.

The jury did not determine

the percentage of total dissolved solids attributable to the
parties or even any particular sample.
The jury found that the Defendant was not responsible
for all the damage caused to Plaintiffs' well.

If the Court

determines that the strict liability rule applies, the
damages should be apportioned and justice requires that
Defendant only be held responsible for the percentage of
pollution attributed to the Defendant by the jury.
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POINT V.

THE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PRODUCE ANY COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THEIR CLAIM FOR
DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, DISCOMFORT
AND ANNOYANCE. FURTHERMORE, THE RESPONDENTS
FAILED TO REQUEST THE COURT TO INSTRUCT THE
JURORS ON THE ISSUE, AND, THEREFORE, THE
TRIAL COURT WAS PROPER IN DELETING THOSE
DAMAGES FROM THE VERDICT DUE TO THEIR SPECULATIVE NATURE.

The Court correctly ruled at the end of Plaintiffs'
case that the Plaintiffs failed to produce evidence to
support their claim for damages for emotional distress,
discomfort and annoyance.

The Defendant, at the close of

the Plaintiffs' case, moved to dismiss that claim.

The

Plaintiffs' counsel pointed out to the Court that its
clients had testified that they had been emotionally distressed and that Mrs. Branch had left her husband and returned to Colorado at one point.

The Court held that since

there had been no specific showing by the Plaintiffs of the
extent of the damages, that to allow the jury to return a
verdict on that evidence would be to allow the jury to
speculate.

(T. 238-241)

The Court, however, did allow the

Plaintiffs to reopen their case with the opportunity to
produce evidence to support their claim.

The evidence which

was produced by the Plaintiffs on rebuttal merely repeated
the evidence that the Plaintiffs had produced the first
time. At no time did the Plaintiffs produce any evidence as
to the extent of the damages they suffered as a result of
emotional distress, discomfort and annoyance.

The Court

did, however, at the insistence of the Plaintiffs, ask the
jury:
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What separate damages, if any, did Plaintiffs
suffer by reason of mental suffering, discomfort
or annoyance resulting in the pollution of Plaintiffs' wells, if any.
(J. Question No. 18, R.
139)
The jury answered $10,000.00.

After considering the jury

verdict, the Court again dismissed Plaintiffs' claim for
damages due to mental suffering, discomfort or annoyance on
the basis that the jury was not instructed as to the requirements and limits for such an award, and further that
such damages had not been proven and were, therefore,
speculative.
The cases cited by Plaintiffs in support of their
position require special circumstances such as malice and
fraud, before an award can be made for mental anguish,
discomfort and annoyance.

Valley Development v. Weeks, 364

P.2d 730 (Colo. 1961); and, Murphy v. City of Tacoma, 374
P.2d 976 (Wash. 1962).

Legal limitations must be applied to

the award of such damages as pointed out by the comment (j)
to §46 of the Restatement of Torts Second:
Complete emotional tranquility is seldom attainable in this world, and some degree of transient
and trivial emotional distress is part of the
price of living among people. The law intervenes
only where the distress inflicted is so severe
that no reasonable man could be expected to endure
it.
This State has been reluctant to award damages for
emotional distess.

See, Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 341 (1961)

Therefore, before such an award can be made, the jury must
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be adequately instructed so that it can make the appropriate
findings which are necessary before such an award may be
properly allowed.

In the present case, no instruction was

given to the jury defining or explaining what must be shown
in order to allow damages for discomfort and annoyance.

The

jury was merely asked "what separate damages if any, did
Plaintiffs suffer by reason of mental suffering, discomfort
or annoyance resulting in the pollution of Plaintiffs'
wells, if any." (Question No. 18, R. 139).

To ask such a

question without any instruction as to what is legally
recognized as mental suffering, discomfort or annoyance was
error.

In assessing damages for mental suffering, dis-

comfort and annoyance, the jury was required to speculate,
since the Plaintiffs failed to produce evidence on that
issue. The trial court's exercise of its discretion in
deleting that claim from the judgment was proper and should
be sustained.
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CONCLUSION

The trial court's adoption of the strict liability doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher was not supported by the evidence and was contrary to the law of other jurisdictions
which have considered this issue.

The case should be re-

mantled to the trial court with instructions that the case be
handled as a negligence case with instructions on proximate
cause and comparative negligence.

In the event this Court

does decide that strict liability does apply, then the
Court, in fairness, should apportion the damages according
to the jury's finding.
The Plaintiffs failed to produce any competent evidence
as to the amount of damages they sustained due to emotional
distress, annoyance and discomfort.

The jury was not in-

structed on that issue and the trial court was proper when
it deleted those damages due to their speculative nature.
Appellant, therefore, submits that the jury verdict
should be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of December, 1980.
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